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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT  
 
Special Report on Government Dismissal: A Chronology 
by Susan J. Cavan 
 
March 20  Yel'tsin, having spent last two weeks recuperating at Gorki-9, pays 
"surprise" visit to Kremlin, works there for three hours, reportedly catches 
Yastrzhembsky and Yumashev off guard. Yel'tsin has phone conversation with 
Chubais re: wage arrears. 
 21 Yel'tsin meets with Chernomyrdin at Gorki-9, also meets with Yumashev. 
 22 Yumashev calls Kirienko in the evening and tells him to report to Kremlin 
at 8 a.m. 
 23 Yel'tsin sacks government, appoints himself acting prime minister; two 
hours later (after market drop of 10 percent?), names Kirienko acting PM. 
Praises Chernomyrdin, awards him medal (2nd class). Targets of dismissals: 
Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Kulikov. 
 24 Yel'tsin praises Sergeev and Primakov. Yastrzhembsky denies 
Berezovsky, Yumashev or Livshits had any influence. Yuksi and ELF Aquitaine 
(FR) announce 5 percent deal. 
25 Yel'tsin warns staff that failure to implement decrees "means death." Nash 
Dom Rossiya holds meeting. Prosecutor files embezzlement charges against 
former State Property Committee (GKI) deputy Ivanenko and associate. 
Berezovsky claims role in government dismissal. 
 26 Yel'tsin meets Chirac and Kohl--gets confused. Kirienko chairs cabinet 
meeting. 
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 27 Yel'tsin nominates Kirienko and threatens Duma with dissolution 
(something he later denies doing) and again praises Chernomyrdin. Seleznev 
says he's disappointed, but won't give president grounds for dissolution. 
 28 Chernomyrdin announces candidacy for presidency; Kremlin "surprised." 
Decree on Security Council reorganization. 
 29 Kirienko says Chubais won't chair Unified Energy System (UES) board. 
Klimentev wins mayor's seat in Nizhni Novgorod. 
 30 Stepashin appointed MVD chief. Yel'tsin again denies he'll seek third term. 
 31 Yel'tsin confirms Primakov and Zadornov (Finance) will be in new 
government (corrects aides who refer to them as "acting"). Duma leaders request 
roundtable. Kirienko reaffirms Rosneft shares/price. 
 April 01 Duma's Communists, Nationalists and Agrarians request 
withdrawal of Kirienko nomination. Rossiyskiye vesti editor announces it will no 
longer be an official organ of the administration. Nizhni election commission 
annuls mayoral results. Deputy Chief of Staff Savostyanov dispatched to Nizhni 
to investigate. 
 02 Yel'tsin renominates Kirienko and agrees to roundtable. Duma vote 
postponed. Novye izvestiya (Berezovsky-owned) accuses Kirienko of unethical 
financial dealings. Klimentev arrested. 
03 Duma requests Kirienko citizenship information (question over possible 
Israeli citizenship). Duma votes to investigate Nizhni election. Yel'tsin postpones 
Japan trip. 
04 Yel'tsin sacks his representative in Nizhni, Yuri Lebedev. Kirienko 
promises to pay wage arrears before workers protest. Chubais elected to board 
of UES. 
05 Stepashin suggests new law to prevent bandits from running for office. 
06 Constitutional Court decides Yel'tsin must sign trophy art law. Berezovsky 
backs Kirienko. Mixed signals from Kremlin on Yel'tsin compliance with 
Constitutional Court (CC) ruling. Eventual decision: Yel'tsin will sign law, but 
challenge it over voting procedures. Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov says Iran 
nuclear reactor deal to proceed. 
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 07 Roundtable meeting. Yel'tsin warns parliament against destabilizing the 
country with hesitancy over Kirienko nomination. Clear Zyuganov/Seleznev split 
over Kirienko candidacy. Yel'tsin lists other candidates considered for PM job 
before decision--Luzhkov, Stroev among them. Kirienko holds cabinet meeting--
claims 700 million rubles had been sent to regions. Approximately 3,000 defense 
industry workers protest at government headquarters. Berezovsky urges 
business to back Chernomyrdin for president. 
 08 Kotenkov (president's Duma representative) says Kirienko unlikely to win 
in first round. 
 09  Workers' Protest (called by Communists/FITUR) attracts hundreds of 
thousands across several Russian cities. (~789,000 protesters?). 
 10 Duma rejects Kirienko candidacy (secret ballot voting: 186-143). Yel'tsin 
immediately renominates Kirienko. Aleksandr Putilov, chair of the board of 
Rosneft, complains that asking price for share is too high. 
 12 Former Border Guard chief Nikolaev elected to State Duma in a special 
by-election in southern Moscow. Yel'tsin, meeting with his new Border Guard 
chief, warns him not to follow divisive path of his predecessor. 
 13 Yel'tsin dismisses calls for constitutional change to succession clause--
and to any constitutional change. Yel'tsin instructs Borodin to assist Duma 
deputies with housing and other "perk" appeals if they show a "constructive 
approach" towards Kirienko nomination. Yel'tsin submits more documents to 
Duma for consideration of Start II. 
 14 Seleznev meets with Yel'tsin, says president willing to cooperate with 
Duma. He also calls for backing of Kirienko in upcoming ballot. Zyuganov and his 
Duma allies from Nationalist, Agrarian parties reiterate their opposition to 
Kirienko candidacy. Duma votes to conduct open balloting for next round, which 
should serve to keep party members closer in line with leadership. Sergei 
Shakhrai supports possible constitutional change to allow Federation Council 
chief to succeed if Yel'tsin should be incapacitated and the prime minister remain 
unconfirmed. Nemtsov states there will be no changes to Rosneft auction pricing, 
despite pressure. 
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 15 Duma asks Constitutional Court to rule on legality of renomination of same 
candidate for prime minister. CC Chair Marat Baglai says court won't decide soon 
and wouldn't apply ruling retroactively. Shakhrai warns that Yel'tsin would 
dissolve Duma if Kirienko is not confirmed and may act to change electoral law 
by scrapping party list system. Yel'tsin signs trophy art law, but appeals on 
content to Constitutional Court. Yastrzhembsky denies reports that Yel'tsin has 
been taken to hospital. Yel'tsin is reported to have threatened Berezovsky with 
deportation over his meddling in government affairs. Viktor Ilyukhin announces 
support for Zyuganov's call to oppose Kirienko. Duma votes to override veto of 
law on state ownership of UES. According to Duma law, the state would retain at 
least 51 percent ownership and foreign participation would be limited to not more 
than 25 percent. 
 16 Yel'tsin claims he is healthy, but admits to going to clinic for dental work. 
Berezovsky denies any split with Yel'tsin, claims Kirienko is too inexperienced to 
run country if Yel'tsin were to become incapacitated (again suggesting Rybkin as 
alternative), and confirms support for Lebed's Krasnoyarsk race. CC Chair Baglai 
states Yel'tsin cannot unilaterally change electoral law. Troops ambushed in 
North Ossetia, three reported killed. Decree stipulates state-owned companies 
must pay dividends to the state. Duma approves new tax code. 
 17 Duma again rejects Kirienko nomination (115-271 in open ballot). Vote 
may be more relevant to power struggle within the Communist faction than to any 
conclusions regarding Kirienko's candidacy. Yel'tsin renominates Kirienko. 
Zyuganov again questions constitutionality of renomination. Kirienko states he 
will not allow cabinet positions to be used as bargaining chips in the current 
struggle. 
 18 Yel'tsin in Japan for "casual" meetings with Hashimoto. Seleznev calls for 
support of Kirienko on third ballot claiming, "Russia will not forgive us if we 
sacrifice the State Duma over a nomination for Prime Minister." Yabloko leader 
Yavlinsky still not willing to support Kirienko. 
 19 Yel'tsin and Hashimoto discuss disputed islands and set up a Joint 
Commission on Drafting a Peace Treaty, as well as a Joint Investment Fund. 
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Zyuganov reiterates his opposition to Kirienko. Former Deputy Prime Minister in 
charge of Agriculture, Zaveryukha, wins Duma seat in a by-election in 
Kamchatka Oblast. 
 20 Yel'tsin praises Sergeev on occasion of his 60th birthday. Kirienko meets 
with Strobe Talbott in Moscow. Vladimir Potanin announces support for Kirienko 
and intention to bid on Rosneft, despite high price. Ekho Moskvy reports onset of 
a campaign by friend of Chubais to win him the UES chair. 
 21 Yel'tsin submits a draft law banning criminal candidates to the Duma. 
Chernomyrdin announces opposition to Chubais as head of UES. 
Yastrzhembsky touring Kurile Islands on "fact-finding" mission. Trophy art law 
goes into effect. Skuratov re-opens Aum Shinrikyo case. Luzhkov in Krasnoyarsk 
campaigning for incumbent Governor Zubov and against Lebed. Zyuganov also 
in Krasnoyarsk campaigning for Petr Romanov. 
 22 Duma passes revised Land Code (with Yel'tsin's changes). Federation 
Council also overrides Yel'tsin's veto of UES law (See 4/15). A helicopter 
accompanying Sergei Stepashin is shot at along Dagestani-Chechen border. 
Central Electoral Commission head Ivanchenko claims new parliamentary 
elections would require new electoral rules to be drafted by Yel'tsin. Seleznev 
announces opposition to Chubais chairing UES board. 
 23 Yel'tsin meets with Seleznev, Stroev in Kremlin and phones heads of 
various Duma factions, including Zyuganov. Yel'tsin also meets with heads of 
coal-mining regions and promises increased attention; he directs Kirienko to work 
on coal sector problems. NDR, LDPR and Russia's Regions announce support 
for Kirienko. Agrarians and People's Power claim split in ranks over confirmation. 
Communists, led by Zyuganov, still oppose. Yavlinsky claims Yabloko will vote 
against en masse, if the ballot is open. If ballot is secret, Yabloko members will 
not vote. Ekho Moskvy reports that Yel'tsin has approved Chubais for UES chair. 
Kremlin press service issues speedy denial. Zyuganov also claims that Yel'tsin 
told him personally that he had not approved Chubais for the job. US air force 
plane removes uranium from Georgian facility. In Krasnoyarsk, Zubov 
confiscates 850,000 newspapers allegedly printed by Lebed, which contains an 
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unflattering article about the Zubov campaign. Svyazinvest sets preliminary terms 
for next shares auction in May. 
 24  In a secret ballot, Kirienko wins confirmation in the Duma (251-25). Many 
deputies either abstained from voting or ruined their ballots. Kirienko, in 
comments to Duma, promises not to break up natural monopolies and 
announces that the Extraordinary Tax Commission (VchK) will meet in May. 
Yel'tsin schedules an address to the nation in the evening. Rosvooruzheniye 
announces plans to expand regional offices into every Russian region (currently 
there are 10 branch offices). The Council of Foreign and Defense Policies 
publishes its report on privatization, which claims that the privatization process 
was "saddled" with criminal capitalization. The Krasnoyarsk Krai electoral 
commission warns Lebed that his campaign material is not meeting standards. 
The commission also claims that four other candidates, including Zubov and 
Romanov, have exceeded fundraising limits. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough 
 
Russia continues to participate in efforts to settle Kosovo crisis 
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov continued Moscow's efforts to resolve the 
Kosovo crisis by political means. He arrived in Belgrade on 2 April. His efforts 
were focused on relaying Russia's position on the crisis to Serbian President 
Milan Milutinovic. Their discussions focused on Russia's position on the UN 
Security Council 31 March resolution on embargo of weapons supplies to 
Yugoslavia. Ivanov said "Russia will not consider the resolution as anti-Yugoslav 
which has been adopted in order to punish someone." 
 
Ivanov stressed that the resolution gives a "clear signal both to Belgrade and the 
Kosovo community" to convince them to start talks. Russia welcomes Serbia's 
initiative to begin negotiations on 7 April and hopes for Kosovo's constructive 
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response, the Russian minister said. He also confirmed Russian Foreign Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov's position that the OSCE mediatory mission should not be 
considered as an attempt to internationalize the Kosovo problem. The OSCE will 
try to help localize the problem, but not interfere into internal affairs, Ivanov said. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1634 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
Primakov reaffirms adherence to nuclear nonproliferation 
During talks with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Moscow on 30 March, 
Primakov reiterated Russia's adherence to nuclear nonproliferation measures. 
He stated that Russia strongly opposes several countries approaching "the 
threshold of possessing nuclear weapons," and regretted that "a few countries 
(outside the designated five states) possess nuclear weapons and have become 
unofficial members of the nuclear club." However, he stated that "peaceful use of 
nuclear energy is another aspect" of nuclear security," and said Russia "is ready 
to participate in the world-wide efforts aimed at enhancing security at nuclear 
power plants." (Interfax, 1308 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089) 
 
Russia criticizes US effort in Mideast and is ready to revitalize process  
The Russian foreign ministry regrets that "judging from incoming reports" the 
mission of US special coordinator for the Middle East peace process Dennis 
Ross has not helped to coordinate the positions of Israelis and Palestinians, 
ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov told a 31 March briefing. As a co-sponsor 
of the Middle East peace process, Russia is ready for direct and multilateral 
interaction with regional participants in the Madrid process, the United States, 
European Union countries and the entire international community in order to 
revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace talks, he said. (Interfax, 1449 GMT, 31 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-090) 
 
During a private visit to Moscow on 2 April, former Israeli Prime Minister Shim'on 
Peres and Foreign Minister Primakov discussed various aspects of the Middle 
East peace process and ways to overcome the current crisis. Discussions did not 
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only focus on the peace process, however, as Primakov and Peres said they 
supported developing political dialogue between Russia and Israel on regional 
and international issues of interest for both countries. (Interfax 1051 GMT, 2 Apr 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
Primakov stresses importance of START II 
Yevgeni Primakov told a press conference in Moscow on 2 April that the START 
II treaty is in the interests of Russia but stressed that Russia will continue to 
maintain enough arms to ensure a "stable defense of our interests." He also 
indicated that the Duma was close to signing the treaty now that some 
modifications had been made to the existing proposal. (ITAR-TASS, 1243 GMT, 
2 Apr 98; FBIS-TAC-98-092) 
 
Primakov remains in office; foreign policy remains on course 
Primakov stressed that, in spite of the government changes, Russia's foreign 
policy remains consistent and invariable. "President Boris Yeltsin himself 
stressed, and instructed me to stress, the invariability of Russia's foreign policy, 
which would not be affected by changes in the government," the Russian foreign 
minister said 24 March. Primakov also used this announcement in Germany to 
stress that the "development of multilateral and partnership relations with the 
United States continues to remain one of the priorities in Russia's foreign policy." 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 2105 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-083) 
 
Troika not anti-American, but against one-polar world 
"Nothing anti-American" stands behind the upcoming summit between the 
Russian, French and German leaders in Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Nikolai Afanasevsky told Interfax on 23 March 1998. He said that the 
trilateral summit talks will deal with trilateral projects and programs whose 
implementation is "an imperative of our time." Among these projects, he said, is 
the construction of a high-speed highway linking Moscow, Warsaw and Berlin, 
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the joint production of a military transportation plane and the creation of the so-
called Euronet--an alternative to the global computer system Internet. 
 
However, in the same interview Afanasevsky stated that "Everyone recognizes 
the weight and role of the United States, but no one will accept its efforts to play 
the leading role. The European Union, Japan, China and ASEAN also represent 
centers of force." 
 
"One should look for decisions that would help combine possibilities of 
influencing the European situation by all forces, including the United States, 
Western Europe and Russia," he said. Afanasevsky stated further that ample 
opportunity exists for the US to play a role in Europe as long as " no one makes 
attempts to attain unilateral domination." (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 23 Mar 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-082) 
 
Russia welcomes the democratization of Cuba 
Primakov highlighted the Russian government's determination to increase its 
relations with Cuba and advance bilateral ties during Cuban Foreign Minister 
Roberto Robaina's official visit to Moscow on 24 March 1998. Robaina met with 
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov during the official two-day visit which was 
highlighted with the signing of an updated consular agreement. (Details of the 
agreement were not published.) The Ministers reiterated the willingness to 
promote economic-commercial ties and cooperation. (Tele Rebelde and 
Cubavision Networks, 0100 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-LAT-98-082) 
 
During the same visit Primakov stressed that Moscow regards as "wrong and 
counterproductive the economic measures being applied against Havana," and 
that Moscow "would want to promote the process of normalizing relations 
between Cuba and the USA." However, he gave some indication that Cuba must 
assume a positive role in achieving normalized relations with the US, stating that 
Russia welcomed "any movement in the direction of democratization" on the 
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island. Further emphasizing that change is desirable, Primakov stated "it would 
be wrong to think that our relations are directed toward the past." (Interfax, 1407 
GMT, 23 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-082) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Draft laws enabling administrative move of penal system approved 
The government approved the draft of the federal law "on introducing 
amendments to Russian legislation in connection with reform of the penal 
system." This bill creates the necessary legal basis for transferring the penal 
system from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. The move 
was occasioned by Russia's membership in the Council of Europe which required 
the shift. 
 
The bill contains two sets of changes to 18 existing laws. The first set enables 
the transfer itself and lays the rules for its operation in the future. The second set 
replicates within the Ministry of Justice the laws presently found within the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs that provide employment benefits for those working in 
the penal system. 
 
Shifting the administration of the penal system from Interior to Justice brings 
Russia into line with the rest of Europe. It is too soon to know if the changes will 
bring about a fairer and perhaps more efficient prison system in Russia, but who 
administers the penal system is clearly less important than how it is 
administered. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1001 GMT, 12 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
071) 
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POLITICAL PARTIES 
Zhirinovsky courts the gay vote in St. Petersburg 
Lurching from the insane to the bizarre, Liberal Democrat leader Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky has somehow come up with the idea that "sexual minorities" could 
provide a main [sic] source of support for his party. In order to illustrate this 
curious idea, Zhirinovsky went off to St. Petersburg's biggest gay club. 
 
It seems that the club's patrons were pleased to see the LDPR leader--and 
especially liked his attitude toward the "relationships of sexual minorities." It is 
not entirely clear what his attitude is, but Zhirinovsky mentioned something about 
homosexuals being no threat to society because both a man and a woman are 
needed to have children. Whatever logic is contained in this statement can be 
known only by its author. It seems Zhirinovsky enjoyed himself so much that he 
extended his meeting with the "sexual minorities" by two hours before moving off 
to Pskov. (NTV, 1600 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085) 
 
MEDIA 
Luzhkov resurrects a national newspaper 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has announced the re-establishment of the news 
daily "Russia" which first appeared in 1898. The new editor-in-chief, Tatiana 
Tsyba, says the revival was timed to the centennial of the paper's founding. The 
daily will be backed by the Moscow City government and will have eight pages 
with an initial circulation of 100,000 copies. 
 
The establishment of another national newspaper based in Moscow and 
ultimately subject to the editorial pressures of the city is in keeping with 
Luzhkov's consolidation of his political power base. It is no secret that the mayor 
has presidential aspirations, or at least interest in landing a powerful 
governmental position in the post-Yel'tsin era. This is a wise move for the mayor 
for two reasons: It allows him free and direct access to the citizens of Russia 
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were he to run for office, and guarantees that he will remain a powerbroker if he 
decides not to run. (ITAR-TASS, 0314 GMT, 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-086) 
 
REGIONS 
Contracts between the center and the regions continue to be signed 
It has been four years since the first "treaty" delimiting the respective 
responsibilities and duties of the federal and regional governments was signed 
between the federal authorities and Tatarstan. Since then, 40 other 
regions/components of the federation have signed similar treaties, thereby 
bringing 52 percent of the population under such agreements while covering 75 
percent of the territory of the federation. 
 
When asked about the benefits of this emerging federalism, Vasili Likhachev, 
chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan and deputy chairman 
of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, claimed that most if not all 
of the economic and social success in his region was directly attributable to the 
benefits of the treaty. While this claim may be somewhat if not entirely 
exaggerated, federalism, and the piecemeal method of implementation, are 
valuable for other reasons. 
 
First, treaties, or perhaps more accurately, memoranda of understanding (the 
definition of regional sovereignty and thus the standing of the regions to treat 
remains unresolved) acknowledge the gap in administration caused by the 
collapse of Soviet centralism. The treaties in effect recognize the budding 
decentralization of authority. Second, the piecemeal approach is an extremely 
effective method of implementing federalism under the nose of its many 
opponents in the Duma and elsewhere. Third, the always tricky paradox is 
avoided of where sovereignty ultimately resides in a federal system. If the issue 
were to be addressed on the collective level, say through some form of 
Convention of the Regions, the issue of the legal standing of both contracting 
parties would have to be resolved. And if the histories of other federal systems 
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are any guide, no one answer is obvious and solutions that do exist are the result 
of decades or centuries of protracted struggle between centers and regions. 
However, once all 89 regions have signed treaties with the federal authorities, it 
would become much easier to unify the treaties into one common memorandum 
of understanding, which then might become part of the constitution. 
 
Incidentally, federalism is one of James Madison's constitutional mechanisms 
(1787-1788) for ameliorating the deleterious effects of faction in a free society. 
Could a Russian federation, in deed as in word, finally provide for its citizens the 
political and social freedoms so long enjoyed by other societies? President 
Yel'tsin is, unwittingly or not, constructing a federal check on his almost-limitless 
presidential power. Future Russian presidents, finding themselves stymied by 
intransigence in the regions, may wish that Yel'tsin had at least kept up an 
appearance of centralism so that any possible power-grab on their part would 
appear to be only unseemly, not illegal. (Interfaks-AiF, 2-8 Mar 98, p. 18; FBIS-
SOV-98-078) 
 
Luzhkov's power base continues to grow 
Taking advantage of the political turmoil of recent days, and perhaps the 
inexperience of acting Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, Moscow mayor and 
presidential hopeful Yuri Luzhkov met privately with the acting prime minister and 
handed him a "set of fundamental proposals on economic matters" which 
"concern [not] only the city but are important for the whole country." It is not clear 
if the acting prime minister asked for Luzhkov's opinion on matters of national 
importance. But by offering his advice, and undoubtedly his service, Luzhkov is in 
fact establishing a sympathetic voice at the other end of the telephone should the 
mayor be in need Kirienko's assistance. Conversely, Kirienko would be well 
advised to remain friendly with the mayor considering the Kremlin's ultimate 
dependence on city services, Luzhkov's national popularity and influence in the 
Federation Council. (Interfax, 1903 GMT, 25 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-084) 
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However, Luzhkov's influence in the halls of the Federal Assembly is not limited 
to the upper house. The mayor has given his support to the former director of the 
Federal Border Service, General Andrei Nikolaev, in his bid to win a Duma seat 
in the Moscow voting district 197, Orekhovo-Borisovo. [ISCIP Note: Please see 
Editorial Digest, Volume III, Number 5 (March 26, 1998), Domestic Issues and 
Legislative Branch; Federal Assembly, for a full description of this interesting 
race.] 
 
Nikolaev said he and Luzhkov became acquainted when both were working on a 
program to provide humanitarian aid to border guards in Tajikistan. Predictably, 
Nikolaev agrees with Luzhkov on most issues and, although Nikolaev denies that 
the mayor's support will help his candidacy, he does admit that Luzhkov is his 
most important ally. Luzhkov, on the other hand, would certainly appreciate 
another friend in the Duma whose seat is partly the result of Luzhkov's kind 
offices. (Interfax, 1336 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085). 
 
Nizhni Novgorod mayoral election scandal discussed 
Andrei Klimentev, the mayor-elect of Nizhni Novgorod, presently sits behind bars 
charged with campaign violations. The violations have caused the Central 
Election Commission to invalidate the election and new elections are to be 
scheduled. 
 
Klimentev and his supporters have not accepted the developments quietly. On 2 
April, his supporters demonstrated outside of the regional court building where 
Klimentev was being tried. In the process, someone struck the court's chairman, 
Vladimir Vorobyov, across the face. During the morning's events, Klimentev was 
arrested because he has repeatedly left town despite his pledge to the police not 
to do so. (Interfax, 1534 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
A commission of the State Duma arrived on 5 April to find out whether the results 
of the recent elections were annulled lawfully. The commission includes deputies 
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from the communist, liberal-democratic and Yabloko factions, as well as Vladimir 
Semago--a representative for the Public Defense of Klimentiev--a legal defense 
fund recently established. They will inform the State Duma of the investigation 
results next week. 
 
Meanwhile, another rally in support of Klimentiev was held. More than 6,000 
signatures have also been collected in support of the mayor-elect. (ITAR-TASS, 
1353 GMT, 5 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-095) 
 
Central Election Commission wants campaign laws changed 
In response to the problems in Nizhni Novgorod, the commission's chair, 
Aleksandr Ivanchenko, believes that candidates should be required to provide 
information on any criminal record, dual citizenship, and wealth. Unfortunately, 
the State Duma "does not support" the commission's proposals. 
 
Candidates with criminal records were nominated in the Kaliningrad region, 
Primorsk territory, Altay autonomous republic and to the Moscow city legislature, 
he said. (Interfax, 0951 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
Yel'tsin punishes Nizhni Novgorod officials 
President Yel'tsin has fired Yuri Lebedev as presidential representative in Nizhni 
Novgorod region and reprimanded Serge Samoilov, chief of presidential staff in 
Nizhni Novgorod, and Viktoria Mitina, the Kremlin officer to whom the Nizhni 
Novgorod staff members are accountable. The three officials were punished for 
"the unsatisfactory organization of work to carry out tasks entrusted to the 
territorial mission of the president of the Russian Federation and under Article 14 
of the federal law 'On the Fundamentals of State Service of the Russian 
Federation,'" (Interfax, 1253 GMT, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
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By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Kamchatka officers opposed to reform 
The defense ministry has announced its plans to unite military forces on the 
Kamchatka peninsula into one military command. The new command structure 
would be modeled on the one currently employed in the Baltic. The new 
command would have units of the Pacific Fleet, nuclear submarine forces and an 
army corps and air defense units. The defense ministry hopes the new command 
will allow it to save money by combining similar administrative and headquarters 
functions. (ITAR-TASS, 1418 GMT, 20 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079) 
 
The plan to unite forces under one command is not without its critics. Admiral 
Vladimir Kuroedov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, toured the region in 
an attempt to soothe opponents to the plan. One general was overheard to say 
that ground forces would never be subordinated to sailors. The only troop 
strength to be cut is on headquarters staffs. (Radio Rossii Network, 1000 GMT, 
18 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-077) 
 
MiG-based satellite launching system planned 
The Russian and Kazakh governments have announced plans for a satellite 
launching system using the MiG-31 fighter. The MiG-31, capable of flying faster 
than Mach 2 with a ceiling over 50,000 feet, is one of the best interceptors in the 
Russian inventory. The launching system would be similar to the US Pegasus 
system which uses a B-52 bomber as the mother ship. The first tests of the MiG 
launch system are planned in the next 18-24 months. (Interfax, 1145 GMT, 18 
Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-077) 
 
Belarus to build a navy? 
The Belarusian president has completed a tour of several Russian navy bases. 
Completing his trip in Severomorsk, Alyaksandr Lukashenka toured the nuclear 
powered battlecruiser Peter the Great and asked the crew "did we have the 
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problems that the navy has today when the great Soviet Union existed?" (NTV, 
1300 GMT, 25 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-084) In another Severomorsk speaking 
engagement, he stated Belarus was considering "taking one surface ship and a 
submarine under Belarus's patronage." (RFE/RL Newsline, Part 2, 26 Mar 98) 
 
Russia and Ukraine announce navy exercise 
Kyiv and Moscow announced their navies will conduct joint exercises in the Black 
Sea from 17 to 26 April. Russia will be the main organizer of the operation, which 
will involve 40 warships from the Black Sea Fleet and an unknown number of 
Ukrainian ships. (Agence-France Presse, 1123 PST, 19 Mar 98; C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Comment 
During the last, and first, joint exercise held in October, the commanders of the 
two forces could not agree on the purpose of the exercise. Russians said it was 
the start of a new strategic relationship with Ukraine for the common defense of 
the Black Sea. Ukrainian officials said the October exercise was in the spirit of 
the NATO Partnership for Peace. 
 
No new aircraft planned until 2000 or 2001  
Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev announced in a nationally televised 
interview that Russia could not afford to buy new aircraft until 2000 or 2001. 
Aircraft upgrades would continue, he said. (Agence-France Presse, 0704 PST, 
21 Mar 98; C-afp@clari.net) Earlier press reports and statements from the 
defense minister and commander-in-chief of the Air Force indicated that Russia 
was seriously considering the purchase of strategic bombers from Ukraine. 
President Yel'tsin's spokesman said the president decided not to buy the 
Ukrainian planes. (Agence-France Presse, 0634 PST, 25 Mar 98; C-
afp@clari.net) 
 
Russian military had 26,302 crimes in 1997 
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Russia's chief military prosecutor, Colonel-General Yuri Demin, said in an 
interview that servicemen committed 26,302 crimes including 304 murders in 
1997. He said 42 percent of the crimes involved draft dodging. Demin reported 
that his office had successfully prosecuted five general and flag officers including 
a former commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy. He also stated seven criminal 
cases were opened on military prosecutors for taking bribes in exchange for 
dropping charges. (ITAR-TASS, 1154 GMT, 20 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079) 
 
Sergeev pushes for START II ratification 
Defense Minister Sergeev has once again gone to the Duma to push for START 
II ratification. The former commander-in-chief of the strategic rocket forces stated 
"in the purely military sphere I say that the ratification of the treaty is extremely 
necessary, I have proofs to that." (ITAR-TASS, 1527 GMT, 3 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-093). 
 
Also expressing interest in START II ratification, Duma Speaker Seleznev has 
predicted the lower house will ratify the treaty before the Spring session ends in 
late June. He stated the Duma will approve the treaty because the treaty "meets 
Russia's interests." (RFE/RL Newsline, Part I, 7 Apr 98) 
 
Sergeev decries state of military 
Speaking to a gathering of senior and retired military leaders, Sergeev stated that 
NATO spends ten times more on each soldier (in terms of salary, benefits, arms 
and equipment) than Russia does. He said it is not quite logical "to have a budget 
like in Mozambique and expect an army like in the United States." (ITAR-TASS, 
1657 GMT, 8 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-098) 
 
He also stated that 53 percent of the military's aircraft and 40 percent of the 
antiaircraft systems, armored equipment and artillery were in need of overhaul. 
He said Russia's military had failed to integrate the lessons and experience of 
Afghanistan and Chechnya into the military's training activities. More ominous 
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was an implied threat that the military's dire financial situation risked turning the 
army against the government. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 9 Apr 98) 
 
Eight die in war game 
Eight Russian servicemen have died during war games being held in Tajikistan. 
On 11 April two pilots died when their SU-25 fighter-bomber crashed; on 14 April 
six soldiers died and another fifteen were seriously injured when their armored 
personnel carrier was hit by a missile. Press reports have been sketchy on 
details of the mishap. The exercise involves Russia's 201st division, one of the 
best in the Russian military. The two accidents occurred in the presence of 
Russia's ground forces commander, Colonel-General Golovnev, and the 
commander of the Volga military district, Colonel-General Sergeev. (Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 16 Apr 98) 
 
Senior officers killed in ambush 
The Russian interior ministry announced that seven soldiers, including a general 
and four colonels, were killed in the North Caucasus. The attack occurred in a 
border region between Ingushetia and North Ossetia. General Viktor Prokopenko 
of the General Staff, one of Russia's most senior officers, was killed and Colonel-
General Nikolai Mukhin was seriously wounded. The attackers used machine 
guns and rocket-propelled grenades in their ambush. Chechen government 
officials denied involvement in the attack; in fact the Chechen deputy prime 
minister, Kazbek Makhashev, was in Moscow for talks with Russian officials. 
(UPI, 0816 GMT, 16 Apr 98; C-upi@clari.net) 
 
Motorola's Iridium closer to operation with Proton launch 
The Russian Space Agency successful placed seven Iridium satellites into orbit 
on 7 April. The Proton launch was the first this year following a failure of the 
launch system in December when the agency attempted to place the Asiasat in 
orbit. The launch was valued at over $57 million and was the third the Russians 
have conducted in support of the Iridium system. Russia has placed 21 of the 66 
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satellites of the Iridium constellation into orbit. (ITAR-TASS, 0423 GMT, 7 Apr 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-097) 
 
United Technologies to build Energomash rocket engines 
The Russian RD-180 engines developed by the Energomash firm will be 
manufactured under license in the United States by United Technologies 
Corporation. Engines will be built to supply around 400 launches over the next 25 
years using the Atlas booster. In Russia an RD-180 engine costs $8-10 million. 
(Interfax, 0949 GMT, 13 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-103) 
 
China orders SS-N-22 Sunburn missile 
China has ordered an unspecified number of SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles for its 
four Sovremenny class destroyers previously ordered from Russia. The antiship 
missiles are supersonic and have a 75-mile range. (Agence-France Presse, 0521 
PDT, 15 Apr 98; C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Comment 
Although the sale of the four Sovremenny destroyers with their associated 
antiship missiles significantly improves Chinese capabilities, other navies in the 
region still maintain impressive forces. The Japanese Maritime Self-defense 
Force has commissioned Aegis-equipped destroyers; Taiwan has expressed 
great interest in obtaining Aegis destroyers for its navy too. 
 
S-300 antiaircraft missile system back in the news 
As the posturing continues on the delivery of S-300 missile systems to Cyprus, 
the Russian foreign ministry has issued a statement to the effect that the need for 
the missile system might vanish if a demilitarization agreement for Cyprus is 
reached. Primakov took the opportunity to stress that "our [Russian] arms 
deliveries are frequently linked to our active policy of settling the conflict." In a 
Rossiyskaya gazeta interview with Russia's ambassador to Cyprus, Georgi 
Muradov, Muradov defended Cyprus' selection of the S-300 based on 
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affordability and effectiveness as well as the country's right to conclude contracts 
with Russia or any other partner. He also confirmed that Russia has begun steps 
to fulfill its contractual obligation. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 19 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
079) 
 
Meanwhile, Russia is entering the East Asian market with new goods, namely a 
proposed sale of the S-300 to South Korea, historically an all-American arms 
market. NTV recently broadcast a program highlighting South Korean interest in 
the antiaircraft system. Comparisons were made with the US Patriot missile 
system, claiming over a 90 percent kill rate and effective coverage area three 
times that of the Patriot. (NTV, 1600 GMT, 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-087) 
 
While successful Russian ventures into previously US-monopolized arms 
markets are not new, Malaysia being only one example, it is an interesting 
scenario when considering that US troops are actually hosted by South Korea. Of 
primary concern is what message such prospective sales may reveal concerning 
Russia's attitudes or support for the "other side," in this case North Korea. 
 
Russia and Greece continue to strengthen relationship 
Efforts to increase cooperation between Russia and Greece have continued 
steadily since the intergovernmental Russo-Greek commission for military-
technical cooperation met in Athens last fall. ITAR-TASS reported that Colonel-
General Leonid Ivashov, who led the Russian delegation at that meeting, has 
indicated that Greek Defense Minister Tsokhatzopoulos' visit to Moscow 31 
March-2 April is very important. Ivashov said "it is hoped ... we can set an 
example of Russia's versatile cooperation with a NATO country. This interaction 
will not harm anyone ..."(ITAR-TASS, 1456 GMT, 20 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079). 
Duma Chairman Seleznev reportedly told Tsokhatzopoulos during his Moscow 
visit that Russian-Greek military-technical cooperation has "brilliant prospects." 
According to an Interfax report, Seleznev stated that the two countries have 
similar positions on diplomacy and defense with which the Greek defense 
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minister concurred. Tsokhatzopoulos offered further that historically, the two had 
been on the same side in conflicts that have occurred in the past 100 years. In 
addition to military-technical cooperation, NATO enlargement was also 
discussed. Seleznev reportedly confirmed that all Russian authority opposes the 
enlargement. (Interfax, 0906 GMT, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-091) 
Tsokhatzopoulos said that Greece plans to buy antiaircraft systems (S-300), 
speed boats, inflatable cushions and electronic systems from Russia and that 
purchases are to be on a tender basis. The Greek government has already 
designated four trillion drachmae for arms purchase over the next four years. 
(Interfax, 1042 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092) 
 
Such rhetoric makes one fundamentally question both Greece's long-term 
intentions and its past commitment to the NATO alliance. If Russia and Greece 
have indeed been on the same side relative to conflicts over the past 100 years, 
is Greece saying it supported Soviet aggression in places like Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia? Perhaps NATO should further demonstrate its resolve to have 
an alliance based on mutual interest by offering Greece the opportunity, bluntly, 
to "take a walk." Could such fracturing, however, be in line with Russia's security 
objectives? If this cooperation is indeed to demonstrate Russia's ability to interact 
with NATO members individually and on a non-threatening basis, then it remains 
illogical to fear NATO expansion if such access and cooperation can exist. 
 
France acquires Russian battlefield laser 
In another display of cooperation between Russia and a NATO member, France 
has acquired a Russian laser which can be used on the battlefield. ITAR-TASS 
reported that Professor Chuburkin, managing director of the Granat design 
bureau, announced that all design and demonstration work had been 
accomplished by Granat specialists during a three-year defense ministry project. 
All the research and development costs were paid by the French. Future joint 
laser development efforts are under negotiations. (ITAR-TASS, 1053 GMT, 14 
Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104) 
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Additionally, after two years of joint development, Nikolai Makarovets, director of 
the Splav enterprise, announced in a ITAR-TASS interview, that Splav and the 
French firm Selerg are ready to mass produce a modernized rocket for the jet-
propelled salvo-fire Grad system. The Grad is currently used by over 50 
countries according to Makarovets. Since this effort was made on a commercial 
basis, the firms are now seeking financial partners to start production. This 
project is just one of more than 20 examples of joint military and technical 
cooperative efforts between Russia and France since 1994. (ITAR-TASS, 0726 
GMT, 14 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104) 
 
Not that doing things for money is purifying, the French-Russian cooperation 
appears to be more in keeping with the idea behind NATO members' cooperative 
efforts with Russia and other NIS republics. The United States has supported 
numerous commercial efforts between Russian and US companies primarily in 
an effort to help the Russian economy to stabilize and thus not require the 
continued influx of direct aid into the never-never land of the Russian 
bureaucracy. These initiatives of France, Britain, Germany, and others seem to 
be a far cry from the courting that exists in the Greek-Russian arrangements. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tracy Gerstle 
 
UKRAINE 
Fears of a red dawn dismissed 
On 29 March Ukrainians went to the polls to vote for a new Rada (the Ukrainian 
parliament). Turnout was a high 70 percent, and in some of the Western oblasts 
it approached 80 percent. (Intelnews, 0725 GMT, 31 March 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
090) Initial results from the Central Electoral Commission indicate that eight 
parties crossed the four percent electoral threshold. The Communists were by far 
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the front-runners with over 25 percent of the vote and projections that they will 
receive 94 of the 225 party-slated seats. The democratic-nationalist People's 
Rukh came in a distant second with 8.7 percent and 32 seats, though they were 
almost tied by the Socialists/Peasants' Bloc with 7.9 percent and 29 seats. Of the 
other five parties that passed the mark, the Greens should gain 19 seats, the 
Popular Democratic Party 18, the Progressive Socialists 17, and the United 
Social Democrats 16 seats. (Interfax, 1011 GMT, 31 March 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
090) 
 
Independent candidates made a strong showing, with 114 elected to single-
mandate seats. The results for another 40 seats have yet to be submitted, but 
the preliminary results indicate that these independent deputies may offset the 
large numbers of left-wingers in the new Rada. Over 50 of these new deputies 
represent the business community, which on the whole is strongly pro-reform. 
(Interfax, 1552 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090) 
 
On election day, Petro Symonenko, the Communist Party's first secretary, 
promised that, if a left-wing coalition was formed in the new parliament, its first 
act would be to "call for the abolition of the institution of the presidency." 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, however, did not seemed worried by this 
threat. Three days later, Kuchma issued a statement that "he has enough 
strength to curb initiators of impeachment of the president." (ITAR-TASS, 1224 
GMT, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-091) Indeed Kuchma was so confident as to 
ensure reporters "we won't turn back," adding that little will change in the arenas 
of domestic and foreign policy, despite election results. He emphasized that his 
cabinet would remain the same, with perhaps some minor changes among 
ministers. (Interfax, 1751 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090) 
 
Comment 
Such high percentages for the Communists will undoubtedly lead to 
sensationalist headlines, proclaiming Ukraine has turned red and that 
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reorientation towards Moscow is imminent. However, the Communists only won 
one-fourth of the seats in the Rada; in the single-mandate seats they gained 
fewer than 40 of the 225 available. Indeed, private businessmen in the 
independent seats topped them, winning in 50 constituencies. The new Rada will 
be more leftist than the previous, but the shifting forces within it will not be so 
great as to allow the Communists to dominate. If anything the change will result 
in more headaches for President Kuchma, since much-needed economic reforms 
will be slowed. 
 
Kuchma may be more concerned with results in Crimea, where Communists lead 
in the regional and national elections, winning over 67 percent of the vote. 
(Interfax, 1117 GMT 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090) 
 
Meanwhile negotiations have started to determine who will be the Rada's new 
speaker, now that Oleksandr Moroz has indicated that he will not run. Twelve 
candidates are said to have thrown their hats in the ring, but no official 
announcements have been issued. Possible candidates include Rukh leader 
Vyacheslav Chernovil, Yevhen, Marchuk of the United Social Democrats, and 
former Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko. 
 
It seems that the Crimean Tartars may have a point 
On 24 March, over 6,000 Tartars took to Simferopol's streets, indignant that the 
Ukrainian Rada vetoed a law which would have allowed the over 90,000 Crimean 
Tartars with valid resident permits, but still without citizenship, to vote in 
upcoming elections. Protesters blocked motorways and public transportation in 
and out of the city, until they were subdued by police. Past Tartar demonstrations 
had always been peaceful, but anger in the community has been growing due to 
the desperate conditions in which most of the Tartars live. The riots only 
subsided when Refat Chubarov, Tartar leader and deputy chair of the local 
supreme soviet, announced he would be meeting with President Kuchma.  
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Only one Crimean Tartar, Lentun Bezavizov, representing the Ukrainian 
Communist Party, was elected to the autonomous region's Supreme Soviet. 
Mustafa Dzhemilev, the chair of the Crimean Tartar Majilis and a deputy to the 
new Ukrainian parliament, said that this demonstrates that Tartars are 
underrepresented in the autonomous republic, due to the current electoral laws. 
(Kyiv Radio, 1800 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090) 
 
Due to the street fights and separatist tensions in the Crimea, the Scorpion 
special forces battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard has been moved 
permanently from Lvov to Sevastopol. Offices from the unit announced on local 
television that they were sent there "to instill law and order in the region and 
prevent bloodshed." (Interfax, 1543 GMT, 10 Apr 98; FBIS-UMA-98-100) 
 
Tarasyuk replaces Udovenko 
Boris Tarasyuk has been named as Udovenko's successor as foreign minister. 
Prior to his new post Tarasyuk was Ukraine's ambassador to the Benelux 
countries and NATO. Tarasyuk is said to be sympathetic to Western concerns. 
He symbolizes a break with the past, since unlike his predecessor he was not 
schooled in Moscow, but in Ukraine where he studied international relations. In 
his acceptance speech Tarasyuk promised to "continue the President's course 
aimed at Ukraine's integration into Europeans and Euroatlantic structures." He 
deemed this as vital to the "internal situation, as well as international stability and 
security." (Jamestown Monitor, 20 Apr 98) Still, he was careful not to forget 
Russia, stating the another of the ministry's goals will be to develop "normal and 
fruitful relations" with its neighbor. (RFE/RL Newsline, 20 Apr 98) 
 
Comment 
This seems to be a good cop, bad cop scenario. While Kuchma forges closer 
relations with Russia, Tarasyuk will ensure that Ukraine's link to the West 
continues. 
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BELARUS 
Border talks finish with agreement 
Last month, Belarus signed an agreement with the Baltic states confirming a 
border intersection point for the countries at the Liudvinanas Lake, paving the 
way for demarcation of the countries' 500 kilometers of shared borders. The 
agreement was hailed by the four foreign ministers as the beginning of improved 
relations. (ELTA, 1219 GMT, 25 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-084) 
 
In related news, one would wonder how ORT journalists Pavel Sheramet and 
Dmitri Zavadsky could have been charged and tried with illegally crossing the 
Belarusian-Lithuanian border, if that border had not yet been defined. However, 
despite this inconsistency, Judge Alyaksey Hrykevich of the Hrodna Regional 
Court turned down an appeal of the conviction filed by the two reporters. The 
defense intends to now file an appeal against the sentence with the International 
Human Rights Tribunal based in the Hague. (Belapan, 1618 GMT, 24 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-083) 
 
First anniversary of the Union Treaty commemorated 
Belarus celebrated the first anniversary of the signing in the Russia-Belarus 
Union treaty on 2 April. After having been denied a permit to strike in Minsk's 
center, leaders of the Belarusian Popular Front and Social-Democratic Party 
promised they would demonstrate nonetheless. (Belapan, 1638 GMT, 30 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-089) Several hundred protesters showed up at the official 
festivities marking the treaty, shouting "Belarus Lives!" and burning a Russian 
flag. Plainclothes policemen dispersed the crowd and over 20 members of the 
Belarusian Popular Front were arrested, including its acting chair Lyavon 
Barshchewski and deputy chair Yury Khadyka. (RFE/RL Newsline, 3 Apr 98) 
 
Rumors of early parliamentary elections continue 
Opposition leader Gennadiy Karpenko told journalists at a 7 April press 
conference that President Lukashenka had decided to hold parliamentary 
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elections in November, despite the president's previous fervent denials. 
Karpenko cited "reliable sources," claiming the president made the decision 
under pressure from the European Union, Council of Europe and Russian 
President Boris Yel'tsin. Thus far, no such announcement by Lukashenka has 
been forthcoming. (Interfax, 1454 GMT, 7 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-097) Earlier 
rumors claimed that the president had invited OSCE observers to Belarus to help 
prepare for elections. This was deemed suspicious in that, according to the new 
constitution, elections should not be held for another two years. 
 
Honeymoon is over 
Recent tensions over the zaichik's fall--the Belarusian ruble--and transfer 
payments between Belarus and Russia seem to indicate that relations between 
the two Slavic sister states have taken a turn for the worst. Following the 
currency crisis, Gazprom announced that it would cut oil and gas shipments to 
Belarus if the country did not begin to pay some of the $470 million owed to 
Russian fuel suppliers, of which $225 million belongs to Gazprom. Lukashenka 
claimed that Belarus could not pay off the debt due to a decree by Yel'tsin last 
month which scrapped barter agreements for the fuel in favor of hard currency 
payments. Previously Belarus paid for 70 percent of its Russian energy supplies 
in currency and 30 percent in goods. In addition Lukashenka said he was 
"bewildered" by Russian moves to set up customs posts on routes from Belarus 
to Russia. The Russians claim that Belarus had violated a prior agreement that 
all duties collected in Belarus on goods to be sold ultimately in Russia should be 
transferred to the Russian budget. The Russian State Customs Committee 
reported to Interfax that Minsk has withheld over $40 million. 
 
MOLDOVA 
No solid coalitions as of yet 
Moldova's new parliamentarians continue to discuss possible coalitions. 
President Petru Lucinschi reported that two options were being discussed in 
which the For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Bloc (PMDP) would align 
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itself with the Communists or the Democratic Convention (CDM) and Democratic 
Forces (PFD). Lucinschi refused to comment on which of the two he would 
prefer, only stating that he was "ready to cooperate with all of them equally." 
(Interfax, 1518 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089) 
However, the four parties have yet to work out their differences and seem 
headed for deadlock. Vladimir Solonari, head of the PMDP, predicted that 
Moldova faced an unprecedented crisis. He sees the path to forming a productive 
coalition difficult or even impossible, since the winning parties will have to try all 
sorts of combinations of office sharing to reach a consensus. (Basapress, 1900 
GMT, 28 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089) 
 
The new parliament is scheduled to meet for the first time on 21 April. 
(Basapress, 2040 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-083) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Russian Communist leaders campaign for Armenian colleague 
The head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadi Zyuganov, 
and the Communist Chairman of the Russian State Duma, Gennadi Seleznev, 
made televised appeals to Armenian voters on behalf of Sergei Badalian, the 
presidential candidate of the Communist Party of Armenia. The video footage of 
Zyuganov and Seleznev was shown on 12 March during the free air time 
provided to candidates in the run-up to the 16 March balloting. Zyuganov and 
Seleznev expressed support not only for the Communist candidate but also for 
the movement for bringing Armenia into the Russia-Belarus union. (Noyan 
Tapan, 14 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-073) When Badalian failed to enter the second 
round of the presidential election, the Armenian People's Russia-Belarus-
 30 
Armenia initiative decided to back Robert Kocharian in the second round. (Snark, 
24 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-084) 
 
Warm relations between Russian and Armenian Communists have been 
developing steadily over the last year and have focused on reuniting the two 
countries. Badalian has been calling for Armenian accession to the Russia-
Belarus Union at least since May 1997, very soon after the creation of that 
institution. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1 May 97; FBIS-SOV-97-121) Reportedly, 
his Armenian People's Initiative Russia-Belarus-Armenia has gathered over a 
million signatures from Armenians in favor of this policy and seeks to submit the 
question of Armenia's accession to the union to a national referendum. (Radio 
Rossii Network, 16 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-228) In September 1997, the Russian 
State Duma adopted a resolution in favor of this initiative and created a special 
commission to support it. (Noyan Tapan, 26 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-269). In 
November 1997, Seleznev, in his capacity as chairman of the Russia-Belarus 
Union's Parliamentary Assembly, granted special observer status the Armenian 
People's Initiative Group. (Snark, 6 Nov 97; FBIS-SOV-97-310) 
 
First round of presidential elections: allegations of fraud refuted 
Five presidential candidates made a joint statement alleging electoral fraud in 
Armenia's first round of presidential elections which were held on 16 March. The 
candidates, Karen Demirchian, Vazgen Manukian, Paruyr Ayrikian, Sergei 
Badalian, and Dadiv Shakhnazian, claimed that the "entire electoral process, 
even before the end of voting, shows that the elections are being held with a 
large number of violations of the law and falsifications and in a threatening 
atmosphere.... We declare that the extraordinary elections for the post of 
president of the Republic of Armenia, regardless of the result, cannot be 
considered free and fair." (Snark, 16 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-075) 
 
Prime Minister Robert Kocharian's campaign headquarters responded to these 
allegations by stating that the few reported breaches of the law could not have 
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been sufficient to affect the outcome of the election. According to the Kocharian 
camp, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) had received complaints from 
about five or six out of 1,600 polling stations. (Snark, 17 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
076) 
 
The OSCE election observers found that violations of the law occurred in 15 
percent of the polling stations. In their estimation the irregularities could have 
affected the outcome if the number of votes cast for each candidate were more 
or less equal. The OSCE also identified other problems such as commanders 
telling servicemen how to vote, the presence of officers from the interior ministry 
in some polling stations, and biased reporting shown on the state-owned mass 
media. (ITAR-TASS, 18 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-077) The chairman of the CEC, 
Khachatur Bezidzhian, issued an angry retort to the OSCE report, calling the 
criticisms "groundless" and "ill founded." (Snark, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085) 
 
According to the CEC the final results of the first round of voting were as follows: 
Voter turnout stood at 63.49 percent of the eligible population. Robert Kocharian 
received 38.76 percent of the vote; Karen Demirchian, 30.67 percent; Vazgen 
Manukian, 12.24 percent; Sergei Badalian, 11.01 percent; Paruyr Ayrikian, 5.41 
percent. Each of seven other candidates received less than .5 percent of the 
vote. On March 24, the CEC made the formal decision to hold the second round 
between Robert Kocharian and Karen Demichian on 30 March 1998. (Snark, 24 
Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-083) 
 
Second round: Kocharian wins and promises to rein in the presidency 
Four days before the runoff election was held, Kocharian announced his intention 
to amend the constitution to alter the relations between the president and the 
prime minister, the president and the government, and the president and 
parliament. One proposed change would revoke the president's power to disband 
the National Assembly. Kocharian said that approximately 70 changes to the 
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constitution would be required to lessen the power of the presidency and ensure 
greater independence for the judiciary. (Interfax, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085) 
 
His other campaign promises included promoting direct talks between Nagorno-
Karabakh and Azerbaijan (which Baku opposes) and establishing dual 
citizenship. He told reporters that "The president of Armenia should be a 
president of all Armenians." (Interfax, 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-086) If adopted 
this measure would grant Armenian citizenship to Karabakh Armenians and 
effectively unify the two entities. 
 
On 1 April CEC Chairman Ruben Manukian announced that, although vote 
counting was unfinished, it was clear that Prime Minister Robert Kocharian had 
won the presidential election. By 5:00 p.m. on 1 April , the commission had tallied 
99.4 percent of votes. Voter turnout was 68.9 percent. Kocharian received 59.3 
percent of votes, while Karen Demirchian mustered 40.7 percent. (Interfax, 1 Apr 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-091) 
 
The day of the second round the CEC received 50 reports of violations in the 
voting procedure. (Snark, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089) However, the 
international observers gave a better assessment of the second round. The 
OSCE, which was highly critical of the first round, found that the second round 
was "well organized and proceeded calmly and in accordance with the law." The 
OSCE pointed out that, although the violations favored Kocharian, they did not 
affect the results of the election. (Snark, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094) Many in 
Armenia, ranging from the leaders of the nationalist Dashnak party to the election 
monitors of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, had suggested 
that the OSCE's highly critical stance in the first round may be due in part to 
Kocharian's opposition to the OSCE mediators' proposal for Nagorno-Karabakh. 
(Snark, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-093) The OSCE had decided to extend its 
mission to investigate fully the charges of electoral fraud which were still being 
reported in early April. 
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AZERBAIJAN 
Aliev protests planned export of S-300 missile systems to Armenia 
In a letter to Russian President Boris Yel'tsin, Azeri President Gaidar Aliev 
reiterated his concern over Russia's clandestine deliveries of over $1 billion in 
weapons and military supplies to Armenia and protested the planned transfer of 
S-300 antiaircraft missile systems to Armenia. In January and February of this 
year, Baku had received reports of secret negotiations between Russia and 
Armenia concerning plans for new transfers of Russian weapons to Armenia, 
including the S-300 systems. (Interfax, 16 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-075) That 
system parallels the US Patriot missile system and, while it is a primarily a 
defensive weapon, the missile technology can have offensive applications. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Bishkek hosts conference on refugees in Central Asia 
A regional conference on the repatriation of refugees mainly from Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan convened in the Kyrgyz capital on 31 March. In addition to 
representatives from all of the Central Asian states, members of a number of 
international organizations (e.g., the UNHCR) also attended the conference 
(Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network, 0600 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
090). One of the issues raised by members of the Tajik delegation was the 
repatriation of the estimated 90,000 Tajik refugees currently living in the Central 
Asian republics. The Tajik Minister for Labor and Employment, Khudoiberdi 
Kholiqnazarov, stated that the main obstacle to the refugees' return was of an 
economic nature. Many of the refugees have no homes to go back to, and the 
Tajik government would not be able to provide accommodations for all of them, 
or ensure the return of their property (ITAR-TASS, 1503 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-090). 
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A few days later, in an interview with the Iranian News Agency (IRNA), Kyrgyz 
Minister of Labor and Social Protection Asylgul Abdurekhmenova stated that 97.8 
percent of the refugees who fled to Kyrgyzstan during the civil war were actually 
ethnic Kyrgyz and had no desire to return to their former places of residence in 
Tajikistan. There are currently 15,114 refugees from Tajikistan registered in 
Kyrgyzstan and many of them live in urban areas, particularly Bishkek. This large 
population influx has put a strain on Kyrgyzstan's social and economic resources 
(Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094). 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Human rights watch asks for presidential pardon 
The international agency Human Rights Watch has sent a letter of appeal to 
President Rahmonov, asking that he commute the death sentences of Abduhofiz 
Abdullojonov and the five other National Revival Bloc members who were 
sentenced to death for conspiring to assassinate Tajikistan's president in April 
1997. The letter also stated that the arrest and sentencing of Abdullojonov and 
his fellows appears to be motivated primarily by political reasons, rather than by 
the desire for justice, and that Abdullojonov (who is terminally ill with cancer) is 
not receiving any medical attention in prison. Copies of the letter were sent to the 
offices of Tajikistan's National Reconciliation Commission, the International Red 
Cross Committee, and the OSCE mission (ITAR-TASS, 1122 GMT, 2 Apr 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-092). 
 
Comment 
The arrest and subsequent conviction of Abduhofiz Abdullojonov and the other 
20 members (5 received death sentences, 15 others received prison sentences 
of varying lengths) of the National Revival Bloc (NRC) who have been accused of 
conspiring to assassinate President Rahmonov in Khujand last April does indeed 
seem politically motivated. Few details of the arrest and trial are available, which 
implies that the men most likely received less than the "due process" to which 
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they were entitled under international law. The main motivations for their arrest 
may well be linked to the National Revival Bloc's opposition to President 
Rahmonov and his administration. Khujand has been the site of fairly vociferous 
opposition to President Rahmonov's policies since at least the Spring of 1996. 
With the prospect of parliamentary elections looming in the Fall, President 
Rahmonov may be trying to garner support for himself and his followers any way 
he can. He recently traveled to Khujand in order to appeal for the backing of 
regional leaders there. No declarations of support were forthcoming from 
Abdumalik Abdullojonov, the chairman of the NRC (and Abduhofiz Abdullojonov's 
brother). Perhaps the president hopes to acquire this support in return for 
pardoning at least those members of the National Revival Bloc who received 
death sentences. 
 
Tajik president appeals for more Russian support on Afghan border 
On 31 March a visiting session of the Collegium of Russia's Federal Borderguard 
Service (FBS) convened in Dushanbe, with the participation of Russian Security 
Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin and FBS Director Nikolai Bordiuzha, who 
arrived in Tajikistan on 30 March in order to inspect border post installations and 
security (ITAR-TASS, 0943 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-UMA-98-089). The meeting's 
main focus was on the readiness and ability of the FBS units stationed along the 
Tajik-Afghan border to protect Tajikistan's security. President Rahmonov 
addressed the session, expressing his concern that the border posts are "both 
numerically and qualitatively" undermanned. His main fears were that the still 
highly unstable situation in Afghanistan might affect Central Asia's security. The 
president also pointed to the problems brought on by the increasing drug trade 
from Afghanistan to Central Asia across Tajik territory. He stated that he did not 
want his country to be turned into a transfer station for narcotics smuggling, but 
that Tajikistan could not cope with this phenomenon alone and needed Russia's 
aid in taking steps to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan (ITAR-TASS, 1124 
GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090). 
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Comment 
President Rahmonov's fears about the narcotics trade from Afghanistan through 
Tajik territory are no doubt well-founded. However, it is unlikely that an increase 
in Russian FBS personnel or equipment would have much effect in halting the 
drug trade's flow over the border. Russian military commanders have declared 
that it is physically impossible to seal completely the Tajik-Afghan border. 
Furthermore, there has been some speculation that both Russian and Tajik 
border troops and local militia units are involved in the drug trade themselves, as 
both traders and users. The chaotic economic situations in both Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan have turned the narcotics trade into one of the few consistently 
profitable and stable businesses (the demand for narcotics continues to increase 
in many of the former Soviet republics, including Russia). 
 
New outbreaks of violence in Kofarnihon district 
During March clashes between local opposition units and Tajik government 
troops and police forces began to occur with increasing frequency in Lenin, 
Darband, and Kofarnihon regions (raiony). On 19 March, the government 
broadcast a lengthy statement on Tajik radio detailing its grievances against the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), and accusing the opposition leadership of 
standing idly by while a number of its local units violated the peace agreement by 
harassing, attacking, and robbing government forces (primarily of food supplies, 
weapons, and ammunition). The broadcast also named Mullo Abdullo, Fathullo 
Khairiddinov, Rawshan Ghafurov, Pirmahmad Aliev, and Rahmon Sanginov as 
the opposition commanders whose forces were primarily to blame for these 
violent incidents (Khovar, 1215 GMT, 19 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079). By the end 
of the month, the Tajik government decided to send in troops in order to disarm 
forcibly a UTO unit led by Field Commander Namoz which had been accused of 
illegally assuming control of the town of Jomurii Poion (in Kofarnihon Raion, 
located approximately 20 km east of Dushanbe). According to UTO accounts, a 
large group (its exact number is unclear) of either armed policemen or interior 
ministry troops launched a surprise attack on the UTO base near Jomurii Poion 
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on 24 March (the Tajik government insists that the UTO troops attacked the 
police, when the UTO unit was ordered to disarm) (Voice of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 0330 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085). 
 
Regardless of which story is more accurate, two UTO members and six 
policemen were killed during the shooting which broke out. Upon receiving news 
of the incident, government officials met with UTO leaders in Dushanbe and 
decided to send a joint UN-NRC delegation to the town of Kofarnihon (the 
administrative capital of Kofarnihon District, approximately 25 km east of 
Dushanbe) to begin an investigation of the events, and no further actions were to 
be taken until the delegation had returned and made its report (Voice of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085). Before the 
delegation was able to make contact with the UTO unit (the reasons for which 
UTO Chairman Nuri did not list), an additional 200 government troops and four 
armored vehicles began moving from their barracks in Lenin District toward 
Kofarnihon. The UTO leadership immediately informed the UN observer mission 
about these troop movements and requested that the observers investigate the 
reasons behind the mobilization, as UTO leaders had not been able to contact 
the Tajik government for two hours (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1408 GMT, 25 
Mar 98; FBIS-UMA-98-084). 
 
Government reports, on the other hand, state that the UN-NRC delegation was 
unable to make contact with the UTO unit because UTO troops fired on them as 
they approached. Government spokespersons also stated that reinforcements 
from other UTO units stationed in the vicinity had been arriving in Kofarnihon to 
lend their support to Field Commander Namoz (Interfax, 1429 GMT, 24 Mar 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-083). It is unclear who initiated the next skirmish, but another 
shoot-out occurred between UTO units and government forces; 109 of the 
estimated 200 government troops were surrounded and taken prisoner at their 
temporary base in the Romit Gorge (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1750 GMT, 25 
Mar 98; FBIS-UMA-98-084). 
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The international Contact Group (it includes the ambassadors to Tajikistan of the 
following countries: Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the heads of the OSCE and UN missions to 
Tajikistan), which is responsible for monitoring and guaranteeing the inter-Tajik 
peace process, held an emergency meeting on 25 March and decided to send 
another delegation of NRC members, UN observers and Tajik government 
representatives to Kofarnihon to negotiate a cease-fire and a resolution to the 
conflict (Interfax, 1639 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085). 
 
Negotiations between the two sides continued for approximately two weeks, 
during which local UTO commanders began releasing small groups of the 
captured government troops, usually without preconditions having been set. By 
the evening of 1 April, all of the prisoners had been set free and the government 
troops and armored vehicles which had been stationed in eastern Kofarnihon 
during the conflict were withdrawn (Interfax, 0632 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
092). The most difficult point in the negotiations was the decision on where to 
station the UTO troops once they had been registered and disarmed. Tajik 
government representatives favored moving the UTO units first to Turkobod (a 
village slightly to the south of Kofarnihon) for registration, and then to a special 
camp in the Romit Gorge. The local UTO field commanders insisted that their 
troops be permitted to remain in Turkobod, fearing that the government troops 
might attack them from behind in the Romit Gorge, despite assurances to the 
contrary from UTO Chairman Nuri. Another disagreement occurred over the 
troops' withdrawal from the area of the fighting. Tajik government representatives 
stated that they would only return their troops to the barracks after or at the same 
time as UTO units were withdrawing from Kofarnihon. Small, isolated clashes 
continued to take place between Tajik government and UTO troops (Interfax, 
1019 GMT, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094). 
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Negotiators from both sides finally reached a solution on 5 April, perhaps in spite 
of an ultimatum delivered to the local opposition commanders by General Ghafar 
Mirzoev, the commander of the Tajik Presidential Guard. On the morning of 5 
April, General Mirzoev informed the UTO commanders that, unless they withdrew 
their forces from Kofarnihon by 2:00 p.m. the same day, government troops 
would launch an attack against them (Interfax, 0639 GMT, 5 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-095). Fortunately, the negotiations continued, and it was finally agreed that on 
6 April the local UTO units would move to the Romit Gorge camp, but that 25 
men from the Dushanbe-based UTO battalion would remain in Turkobod to 
protect the families of the local UTO units. Also on 6 April, all of the government 
troops who had moved into Kofarnihon from other raions would return to their 
permanent barracks. Finally, at Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's (deputy leader of the 
UTO and the new first deputy prime minister of the Tajik government) 
suggestion, it was decided to begin reforming Kofarnihon's executive and law-
enforcement bodies to include a 30 percent share of UTO representation in the 
raion administration (ITAR-TASS, 1733 GMT, 5 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-095). 
 
The UTO troops withdrew from Kofarnihon as scheduled on 6 April and moved to 
the camp which was set up for them in the Romit Gorge. By 16 April all of the 
UTO units (a reported total of 530 men) had undergone registration, as well as a 
pre-enlistment medical examination, and were ready for the next phase of 
reintegration with Tajikistan's regular military forces. The situation in Kofarnihon 
had also returned to normal (ITAR-TASS, 0957 GMT, 16 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
106). 
 
Comment 
Based on the many conflicting reports of the Kofarnihon events, it seems that 
both the local opposition commanders and government officials made a number 
of unwise decisions. The roots of the conflict are most likely connected to the 
opposition's frustration with the sluggish movement of the peace process, under 
which they were promised a 30 percent share of administrative appointments at 
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both the national and local levels. Many of the local UTO units stationed in the 
vicinity of Kofarnihon are originally from that region and live there with their 
families. Thus, they consider themselves to be a part of the community, and as 
such desire a voice in community affairs, which is precisely what the terms of the 
general peace agreement promised them. President Rahmonov's slowness to 
implement these changes, as well as his demand that all UTO units first meet the 
terms of the peace agreement's military protocol (disarming, registering, and 
moving to special training camps) as a prerequisite for any further enactment of 
the terms of the political protocol, no doubt provided the incentive for a few of the 
local UTO commanders to take matters into their own hands. Prior to Haji Ali 
Akbar Turajonzoda's return from exile, UTO Field Commander Mullo Abdullo 
publicly stated that his unit would not disarm and register with the government 
until President Rahmonov officially announced Turajonzoda's appointment to the 
post of first deputy prime minister, and that, should the government continue to 
arrest his men for refusing to disarm, his forces would retaliate. Perhaps this is 
what happened in Kofarnihon. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan agree on national sector scheme for Caspian 
Turkmen Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov led a delegation to Baku on 30 
March in order to continue Turkmen-Azeri discussions on the demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea. The two sides initiated their negotiations on 5 February, in order to 
resolve their differences both over the lines of the sea's general division among 
all of the littoral states, and over their disagreement on which country has the 
sovereignty to develop the Kyapaz, Chirag, and Azeri oil fields. These three oil 
fields lie in the center of the Caspian Sea and both countries have claimed 
sovereignty over them (Interfax, 0923 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089). 
 
Insofar as the scheme for the Caspian Sea's general division goes, 
Shikhmuradov and his counterpart, Tofig Zulfugarov, seem to agree almost 
completely. They both favor the national sector division plan, and agree on the 
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need for measures to ensure the sea's environmental safety (Interfax, 1711 
GMT, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-091). However, they were unable to come to a 
compromise on the issue of the contested ownership of the three oil fields. They 
did conclude that the area between the two countries where the three oil fields 
are located should be "divided along a median line in accord with generally-
accepted practice and international law founded on the exercise of sovereign 
rights to the Caspian and taking account of the interests of the littoral states." 
(Interfax, 0923 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089) 
 
Afghan peace consultations take place in Ashgabat 
UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi arrived in Ashgabat on 2 April 
in order to prepare for a meeting with President Borhanoddin Rabbani and 
representatives of other Afghan factions to discuss holding a peace conference 
in the near future (Interfax, 1134 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092). The 
Turkmen government did not plan to participate in these initial discussions. 
President Rabbani arrived on 4 April, as did 'Abdol Karim Khalili, the leader of the 
Afghan Shi'ites. Generals Dostum and Mas'ud sent deputies to represent them. 
The only faction which was invited and did not attend was the Taleban, although 
Brahimi did meet with their leaders prior to his arrival in Ashgabat in order to 
address some of the most important issues slated for discussion. The main focus 
of the meeting was the UN proposal to establish an embargo on arms deliveries 
to Afghanistan. In his earlier meeting with the Taleban leaders in Islamabad, 
Brahimi was able to obtain their approval for the establishment of a monitoring 
committee which would include up to twelve representatives from the various 
Afghan factions and which would begin discussing means of peacefully ending 
the civil war. Brahimi also held meetings with diplomatic representatives of the 
"6+2 group"--China, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran, the 
United States and Russia--which has been set up in order to facilitate the 
organization of a peace conference and of an eventual peace process (ITAR-
TASS, 1804 GMT, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094). 
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In a press conference after the meeting had concluded, President Rabbani stated 
that he and the other representatives of the United Islamic Front (UIF) agreed 
with the Taleban that it was necessary to establish a committee for further 
discussions of an eventual peace and that this committee should hold its first 
session in Islamabad and then continue to meet in other, neutral countries (Voice 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 5 Apr 98; FBIS-NES-98-096). 
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